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EQUITY IN

MERCOSUR:

THE USE OF

ESTOPPEL IN A CUSTOMS UNION
CREATED FOR AND BY COUNTRIES OF

THE CIVIL SYSTEM OF LAW
Jessica M. Guevara, Esq.*t

I.

INTRODUCTION

HE Statute of the International Court of Justice gives us the typical sources of international law.' And among them, the Court recognizes the applicability of general principles of law 2 and equity, if
the parties so agree.3 In common law, one of those principles of law is
estoppel.4 Estoppel permeated the international law system through the5
use of the general principles of law to solve international conflicts.
Among the MERCOSUR sources, general principles of international law
are recognized to be applicable. 6 But the use of estoppel in the
MERCOSUR system has been limited, 7 and the Permanent Review Tribunal narrowed its application, so it can only be used as a measure of last

resort. 8
M. Guevara has a Juris Doctorate with a concentration in international law
studies from SUNY Buffalo Law School. She is a foreign attorney and graduate of
Universidad Cat6lica Andres Bello in Caracas, Venezuela. In Caracas, she dedicated her practice to civil litigation. Currently, she focuses her studies in Alternative Resolution of Conflicts and its impact in the international arena.
To my parents, who made me who I am, and to my husband, thank you for your
infinite support. A mis padries, que hicieron de mi la persona que soy, y a mi
esposo, gracias por tu apoyo incondicional.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 6, art.
38, available at, http://www.icj-cij.org/publications/en/acts-and-documents-no-6.pdf.
Id. art. 38(1).
Id. art. 38(2) (referring to equity in Latin as ex aequo et bono).
See Vernon Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction:A Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 Tui.. L. Rvv. 7, 24-25 (1994).
See Anastasious Gourgourinis, Equity in InternationalLaw Revisited (with Special
Reference to the Fragmentation of International Law), 103 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 79, 80 (2009).
See Olivos Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes in MERCOSUR art. 34.1, Arg.Braz.-Para.-Uru., Feb. 18, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 2 (2003) [hereinafter Olivos Protocol].
See infra pt. V. Only two ad hoc tribunal decisions have decided the dispute considering the principle of estoppel, and the PRT has reviewed the principle just
once.
Prohibici6n de Importaci6n de Neum~iticos Remoldeados Procedentes del Uruguay [Remolded Tires from Uruguay Import Ban], Arbitral Award No. 01/2005,
Uruguay v. Argentina 21 (Dec. 20, 2005), Tribunal Permanente de Revision [Permanent Review Tribunal] (MERCOSUR).
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MERCOSUR is a customs union established in 1991. 9 In 2002,
MERCOSUR created the Permanent Review Tribunal (PTR) 10 in the
Olivos Protocol to provide assurance of the correct interpretation and
application of the MERCOSUR law." This new organ has been able to
perform its purpose through appellate decisions,1 2 Advisory Opinions
4
(AP), 13 and other important functions.'
The Permanent Review Tribunal reviewed the issue of estoppel when
the complaining party in Arbitral Award No. 01/200515 raised the issue
before the tribunal. It is interesting to see this argument being raised for
the second time within the MERCOSUR system' 6 and the reaction of the
court when confronted with it because all the countries conforming
MERCOSUR are countries using the Roman or Civil System of Law.' 7
This paper argues that the decision of the Permanent Review Tribunal
in the Uruguay v. Argentina case, concerning the prohibition on import of
retreaded tires,' 8 was consistent with MERCOSUR system of law because the countries integrating MERCOSUR are countries that use the
Civil System of law. In that case, the court held that the principle of
estoppel is extraneous to the MERCOSUR system of law because it is a
principle originated in the Common law. Additionally, the court held
that the principle of estoppel could only be used as a measure of last
resort. 19
The purpose of this paper is to identify the rule about estoppel in the
MERCOSUR- system in the light of the Permanent Review Tribunal decision and clarify when the principle of estoppel can be adequately argued
in front an Ad Hoc Tribunal or the Permanent Review Tribunal when the
9. See Michael Cornell Dypsky, An Examination of Investor-State Dispute Resolution
under the MERCOSUR and NAFTA Regimes, 8 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 217, 220
(2002).

10. Olivos Protocol, supra note 6, art. 18.
11. Id. at pmbl.
12. Impedimentos a la Libre Circulaci6n Derivado de los Cortens en Territorio Argentino de Vias de Acceso a los Puentes Internacionales Gral San Martin y Gral Artigas, Argentina v. Uruguay, Award No. 02/2006 (Jul. 6, 2006), Permanent Review
Tribunal (MERCOSUR); Arbitral Award No. 01/2005, supra note 8.
13. Opinido Consultiva n. 01/2009 [Advisory Opinion No. 01/2009], (Dec. 1, 2010)
(PRT 2009), available at http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/OPINION_
CONSULTIVA_01-09.pdf?contentid=441&version=l &filename=OPINIONCON

14.
15.
16.
17.

SULTIVA_01-09.pdf; Opinido Consultiva n. 01/2008 [Advisory Opinion No. 01/
2008] (PRT 2008), available at http://www.mercosur.int/show?contentid=441;
Opinido Consultiva n. 01/2007 [Advisory Opinion No. 01/2007] (PRT 2007), available at: http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/PrimeraConsultivaPT.pdf?con
tentid=441 &version=l &filename=PrimeraConsultivaPT.pdf.
Olivos Protocol, supra note 6, art. 23 (the PRT as only instance for dispute resolution), art. 28 (Motion for Clarification), art. 24 (Exceptional Cases).
Arbitral Award No. 01/2005, supra note 8, 21.
See infra pt. V.
See Craig R. Giesze, Helms-Burton in Light of the Common Law and Civil Law
Legal Traditions: Is Legal Analysis Alone Sufficient to Settle Controversies Arising
Under InternationalLaw on the Eve of the Second Summit of the Americas?, 32
INT'i'L LAW. 51 (1998).

18. Infra pts. IV and V.

19. Infra pt. V.
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controversies under the new Olivos Protocol distribunals are deciding
20
pute resolution.
This document is organized in five parts. Part II introduces the
MERCOSUR system including the changes after the Olivos Protocol.
Part III introduces the main characteristics and differences between the
Common Law System of Law and the Roman or Civil System of Law.
Part IV discusses the relevant case in the new regime created by the
Olivos Protocol that raised and solved the use of estoppel in the
MERCOSUR system, which is Uruguay v. Argentina, on the issue concerning the importation of Uruguayan retreaded tires to Argentina. Part
V discusses the doctrine of Estoppel. Specifically, it discusses the principle of Estoppel generally, the application of the principle in international
law courts and tribunals, and the rule of estoppel in MERCOSUR after
the Olivos Protocol.
II. MERCOSUR
22
2
MERCOSUR or Common Market of the South ' is a customs union
established by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay in 1991.23 However, Paraguay was politically suspended from the block 24 right before

Venezuela joined the system in 2006.25 Bolivia joined the block in 2012,26

and it used to be an associate27member of the block along with Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
MERCOSUR established not only a free trade area for goods and services, but also a channel for coordination of economic policies among the
member states. 28 This customs union resulted from a history of political
and economic struggle in the area. After hyperinflation, dictatorships,
and border disputes, the region enrolled itself in an economic coopera20. Olivos Protocol, supra note 6, at ch. I.
21. Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay, and the Eastern Republic of
Uruguay art. 1, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1044 [hereinafter Treaty of Asunci6n],
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/mercosurfta.pdf.
22. See Dypski, supra note 9, at 220.
23. Asunci6n Treaty, supra note 21.
24. Ljiljana Biukovic, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Regional Trade Agreements: South American and Caribbean Modalities, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 255, 267-69 (2007); Paraguay Set Against Venezuela Pact Role, UPI.COM
(5:59 PM March 27, 2013), http://www.upi.com/Fop-News/Special/2013/03/27/Para
guay-set-against-Venezuela-pact-role/UPI-37831364421547/.
25. Nikolaos Lavranos & Nicolas Vielliard, Competing Jurisdictions Between
MERCOSUR and WTO, 7 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 205,209 (2008).
26. Bolivia Signs Mercosur Incorporation Protocol and Becomes Sixth Member,
MERCOPZESS (Dec. 8, 2012, 4:07 AM), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/12/08/bolivia-signs-mercosur-incorporation-protocol-and-becomes-sixth-member.
27. Lavranos & Vielliard, supra note 25, at 209; Stephen Powell & Ludmila Mendoca,
Symposium: The Human Element: The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements on
the Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Managing the Rule of Law in the Americas:
An Empirical Portraitof the Effects of 15 Years of WTO, MERCOSUL, and
NAFTA Dispute Resolution on Civil Society in Latin America, 42 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. Ri.v. 197, 227 (2011).
28. Asunci6n Treaty, supra note 21, art. 1.
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tion era that resulted in the Program for Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE). 29 The PICE is a 1986 trade agreement between
Argentina and Brazil aiming at the creation of a 30common market, which
later precipitated the creation of MERCOSUR.
At the beginning, MERCOSUR was not institutionally strong because
the member states "refrained from creating supranational institutions to
guide the process." 31 However, the Ouro Preto Procotol gave some institutional and structural depth that the system needed because, among
32
other reasons, it gave MERCOSUR international legal personality.
MERCOSUR has a wide range of institutions. The Asuncion Treaty
created the heart of the political organization of the system, which is the
Council for the Common Market and the Group of the Common Market. 33 The Council for the Common Market is the political organ of the
system, which is in charge of the decision-making process in order to secure the objectives established by the union. 34 The Council is integrated
by the various External Affairs and Economy Ministers of the member
states. 35 The Group of the Common Market is the executive organ,
which is coordinated by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each member
36
state.
In 1994, MERCOSUR expanded its institutions by adding the
MERCOSUR Trade Commission, the Joint Parliamentary Commission,
the Economic-Social Consultative Forum, and the MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat. 37 The MERCOSUR Trade Commission, along with
the Council for the Common Market and the Group of the Common
Market, is one of the "organs with decision-making authority. '38 The
MERCOSUR Trade Commission is the organ in charge of assisting the
in the application of the trade policies
Group of the Common Market 39
agreed to by the member states.
The Joint Parliament Commission represents the parliament of each
member state, and its members are appointed by the national parliament
advisory function
of each member state.4 0 This organ "has an important
' 41
with respect to the harmonization of legislation."
The Socio-economic Consultative Forum represents the economic and
See Dypski, supra note 9, at 220.
Id.
Id. at 220-21.
Id. at 221.
Asunci6n Treaty, supra note 21, art. 9.
Id. art. 10.
Id. art. 11.
Id. art. 13.
Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of
MERCOSUR art. 34, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1244, 1258
(1995) [hereinafter Ouro Preto Protocol].
38. Dypski, supra note 9, at 222.
39. Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 37, art. 16.
40. Id. arts. 22, 24.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

41. John Vervaele, Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America, 54 INT_'&
COMp. L.Q. 387, 392 (2005).
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social sectors of each member state. 42 It has a consultative function and
can provide recommendations to the Common Market Group. 43 Finally,
the MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat, which is headquartered in
Montevideo, 44 is the organ of support of the system. It "organizes meetings and handles documentation. '45 "Its powers, however, are rather
weak . . . and purely supporting. [It] has no executive power . . . [and]
cannot, therefore, be compared to the European Commission in the EC
' 46
Treaty or EU Treaty.
The idea of a MERCOSUR dispute resolution system was introduced
in the Asuncion Treaty, 47 but it was not until the Brasilia Protocol was
signed that a dispute resolution system was created. 48 However, the provisions in the Olivos Protocol, which was agreed on 2003 and became
effective in 2004, superseded the Brasilia Protocol's provisions. 49 The
dispute resolution system distinguishes between disputes among member
states, and disputes between particulars and member states. 50 And one
of the most distinguishable characteristics of the Olivos Protocol is the
51
creation of the Permanent Review Tribunal.
The Permanent Review Tribunal can clarify the decision of an Ad Hoc
Tribunal, and it also has appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of Ad
Hoc tribunals. 52 Additionally, this organ serves as "a unique instance of
dispute settlement (by common agreement of the parties involved in the
dispute), as a unique instance of urgent and exceptional cases, and as a
consultative body."' 53 However,
The creation of a judicial body in MERCOSUR is a controversial
issue that has been widely discussed by specialized commentators on
MERCOSUR law. In this regard, some commentators have emphasized the need for a permanent court of justice in MERCOSUR
guaranteeing the enforcement and uniform interpretation of community law. Another part of MERCOSUR legal scholarship proposes to
introduce different changes in the institutional arrangements to address the enforcement problems MERCOSUR faces and to ensure a
uniform application,
without going beyond the present intergovern54
mental machinery.
This controversy occurs because "[t]he MERCOSUR has been designed to reflect its member states' desire to achieve economic integra42. Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 37, art. 28.

43. Id. art. 29.
44. Id. art. 31.
45. Vervaele, supra note 41, at 392.

46. Id.
47. Asuncion Treaty, supra note 21, art. 3.
48. Biukovic, supra note 24, at 271.

49. Id.
50. See Olivos Protocol, supra note 6, at ch. I, XI.
51. Lavranos & Vielliard, supra note 25, at 212.
52. Belen Olmos Giupponi, InternationalLaw and Sources in MERCOSUR: An Analysis of a 20-year Relationship, 25 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 707, 714 (2012).
53. Id. at 715.
54. Id. at 716.
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'55
tion through political cooperation rather than institutionalism.
MERCOSUR is not a supranational organization, but "an intergovernmental organization with community objectives. '56 Each country brings
to the system their own perceptions of economy, social policy, and law,
"because [the MERCOSUR institutions's] members are in fact the representatives of the governments of the four member states. '57 Therefore,
MERCOSUR is only a means to coordinate the objectives of the system
outlined in the Asuncion Treaty. 58 This idea is reinforced by the fact that
"MERCOSUR institutions have surprisingly little power over member
states because they can only reach decisions by consensus and the enforcement of those decisions is at the absolute discretion of the member
59
states."

III.

COMMON LAW V. CIVIL SYSTEM

Although the Common Law and the Civil System (also known as Roman System) come from a common tree, the Roman Law, 60 both have
evolved to have their own characteristics.
As Tetley defines them:
Civil law may be defined as that legal tradition which has its origin in
Roman law, as codified in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, and as
subsequently developed in Continental Europe and around the
world. Civil law eventually divided into two streams: the codified
Roman law (as seen in the French Civil Code of 1804 and its progeny
and imitators-Continental Europe, Quebec, and Louisiana being examples); and uncodified Roman law (as seen in Scotland and South
Africa). Civil law is highly systematized and structured and relies on
declarations of broad, general principles, often ignoring the details.
Common law is the legal tradition, which evolved in England from
the eleventh century onwards. Its principles appear for the most part
in reported judgments, usually of the higher courts, in relation to
specific fact situations arising in disputes, which courts have adjudicated. The common law is usually much more detailed in its prescriptions than the civil law. Common law is the foundation of private
law, not only for England, Wales and Ireland, but also in forty-nine
U.S. states, nine Canadian provinces and in most countries, which
first received that law as colonies of the British Empire and which, in
55. Cherie 0' Neil Taylor, Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration
and an Agent for Deepening Integration:NAFTA and MERCOSUR?, 17 NW. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 850, 867-68.

56. Vervaele, supra note 41, at 392; see also Taylor, supra note 55, at 868; Nadia de
Araujo, Dispute Resolution in Mercosul: The Protocol of las Lenas and the Case
law of the Brazilian Supreme Court, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. RFv. 25, 31 (2001).
57. Biukovic, supra note 24, at 271.
58. Asunci6n Treaty, supra note 21, art. 1.
59. Biukovic, supra note 24, at 270-71; Powell & Mendoca, supra note 27, at 242-43.
60. HFNRY M. HERMAN, TiHn LAW OF ESTOPPEL 7 (1871).
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many cases, have61 preserved it as independent States of the British
Commonwealth.
Then, the most remarkable and distinctive characteristic of both systems is the source of law. In the Civil System, judges abide mostly to
codified sources.62 However, the judges in Common Law decide their
cases based on a case law system. 63 Prof. Tetley justifies this difference in
that "civil law adopts Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers,
whereby the function of the legislator is to legislate, and the function of
on the other hand, finds in
the courts is to apply the law. Common law,
'64
judge-made precedent the core of its law."
The Roman or Civil System expanded to many countries of Europe
after Napoleon occupied the various territories. 65 Among those countries
were Spain and Portugal, which were the conduits to transport the Civil
66
System to the Americas.
Although the Common Law is known to apply positive non-legislative
rules, "the common law is not limited to published judicial precedent, but
more broadly, is the system of rules and declarations of principles from
which our judicial ideas and legal definitions are derived and which are
'67
continually expanding.
The style by which a judge resolves controversies in both systems is
different. In Common law systems, the judge bases his or her analysis on
the facts of the cases; he or she looks for similar fact patterns to determine the law applicable to the case, and when there are not cases similar
68
to the one at hand, he or she creates new rules to resolve the new issue.
On the other hand, the judge on the Civil System "focuses rather on legal
principles. He or she traces their history, identifies their function, determines their domain of application, and explains their effects in terms of
rights and obligations."' 69 In the Civil System, the cases already decided
provide a source for induction of the scope of application of the princi70
ples of law involved.
Another difference between the two systems is the process of interpretation of the law. According to Tetley,
In civil law jurisdictions, the first step in interpreting an ambiguous
law, according to Mazeaud, is to discover the intention of the legislaWilliam Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions:Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and UnLA. L. REV. 677, 683-84 (2000).
62. See id. at 701; Vernon Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction:
A Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 TULANE L. RiV. 7, 13 (1994).
61.

63.

codified), 60
See CHow
CASES, AND

SCIIOENBAUM,

INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS PROBLEM,

MATERIALS 455 (Aspen Publishers, 2d ed. 2010); see also Tetley, note

61, at 701.
64. Tetley, supra note 61, at 701.
65. Id. at 687-88.
66. See id.; see also SCIIOENBAUM, supra note 63, at 446.
67.

JOSEI'H J. BASSANO, IND. LAW ENCYC. COMMON LAW § 1 (1961).

68. Tetley, supra note 61, at 701.
69. Id. at 702.
70. Id.
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tor by examining the legislation as whole, including the "travaux
preparatoires," as well as the provisions more immediately surrounding the obscure text. In common law jurisdictions, by comparison,
statutes are to be objectively construed according to certain rules
standing by themselves, such as that an enactment must be read as a
whole, and that special provisions will control general provisions,
so as to meet
the subjects' reasonable understandings and
71
expectations.
The principles of equity also distinguish the Civil and Common Law
Systems. In the Civil System, the principles of equity "aid, supplement,
or correct the civil law,"' 72 but are not a formal source of law.73 In the
early common law system, "equity softened or abated the rigor of the
common law with the Conscience of the Chancellor. '74 Nowadays, equity in common law "serve[s] the function of altering the course of the
common law system where it results, in spite of long and steady development, are plainly unreasonable, unjust, or offensive. '75
IV. URUGUAY, ARGENTINA, AND RETREADED TIRES
In 1997, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay started exporting retreaded
tires to the Republic of Argentina. 76 During those years, the value of the
exports of Uruguayan retreaded tires exported from Uruguay to Argentina was approximately $1,477,827. 77 However, those operations oc-

curred during only part of each year: in 1998, Uruguay exported the tires
only over a period of eight months; in 1999 only for nine months; in 2000
eleven months; in 2001 three months; and in 2002, only four months. 78
Retreaded tires are a product obtained from a used tire, which was
duly inspected and in good shape; the used tire's external appearance is
reconstructed into a new tire. 79 These tires can be as reliable as a new
tire, but may not last as long. 80 The problem with these tires is that in
some South American countries, the technology necessary to dispose of
the tires does not exist or is prohibitively expensive to implement. 81
Argentina enacted administrative laws that prohibit the importation of
used tires into to the country. Additionally, in 2002, Argentina enacted a
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 704-05.
Palmer, supra note 62, at 8 (quoting Roman jurist Papinian).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 8.

75. Christopher Brown, A Comparativeand CriticalAssessment of Estoppel in Interna-

tional Law, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV 369, 370 (1996); see also Palmer, supra note 62, at
19.
76. Laudo 10/2005 (Uruguay v. Argentina) Prohibicion de Importacion de Neumaticos
Remoldeados,

15 (Tribunal Arbitral) (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://www.sice

.oas.org/dispute/mercosur/laudo%20neumaticos_005_s.pdf [hereinafter Retreaded
Tires I1].
77. Id. T 104.

78. Id.
79. Id. 9172.
80. Id. 1 73-74.
81.

Id. $ 48.
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82
law that also prohibits the importation of retreaded tires.
In 2004, during the LVI Common Market Ordinary Meeting, Uruguay
initiated the mechanism of dispute resolution established in the
MERCOSUR Law.8 3 Argentina was notified, and both parties had diplomatic discussions looking to resolve the impasse. However, an amicable
not reached, and the Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal was
resolution was
84
established.

A.

AD

Hoc

TRIBUNAL ARBITRAL AWARD

On February 18, 2005, the Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal was created, 85 and
each party had a chance to present its allegations. 8 6 Uruguay contended
it
that the 2002 Argentinean law violated the MERCOSUR law because 87
borders.
countries'
the
among
goods
of
flow
the
completely prohibited
Uruguay argued that a violation to the Montevideo Treaty 88 did not occur
in the case because retreaded tires were safe. Uruguay stated that the
retreaded tires did not pose any threat to safety on the highways or to the
environment. 89 Furthermore, Uruguay argued that the Argentinean prohibition violated some provisions of the Asuncion Treaty, 90 the Annex I
of the Asuncion Treaty, some decisions of the Council of the Common
Market, 91 the pacta sunt servanda principle, and the principle of Estoppel.
On the other hand, Argentina argued that the limitation imposed by
the 2002 law, although impeding the unrestricted flow of retreaded tires
an exception to free
through the Uruguayan-Argentinean border, was
92
trade as established in the Montevideo Treaty.
On October 25, 2005, the tribunal decided that the Argentinean law
prohibiting the importation of Uruguayan retreaded tires was compatible
with the MERCOSUR law. 93 The tribunal disposed the estoppel argument based on reasons discussed below. 9 4 The tribunal upheld the law
because the protection of the environment is one of the objectives of
MERCOSUR, and article 50(d) of the Montevideo Treaty allowed Ar82. Id.
83. Id.

14, 42.
11; see Olivos Protocol, supra note 6, art. 4-7.

84. Retreaded Tires II, supra note 76, $ 13; see Olivos Protocol, supra note 6, art. 9-14.

Retreaded Tires I1,supra note 76, $ 1.
Id.
6-10.
Id. $$ 14-15; see Asuncion Treaty, supra note 21, art. 1.
Treaty Establishing a Latin American Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin
American Free Trade Association, Arg.-Bol.-Braz.-Colom.-Chile-Ecuador-Mex.Para.-Peru-Uru.-Venez., Feb. 18, 1960, 2 M.I.G.O. 1575, available at http://www
.sice.oas.org/trade/montevtr/Montevl.asp [hereinafter Montevideo Treaty].
89. Retreaded Tires 1I,supra note 76, 1 16.
90. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 21, arts. 1, 5.
91. Council of the Common Market Decision 22/00, MERCOSUR (July 30, 2000);
85.
86.
87.
88.

Council of the Common Market Decision 57/00, MERCOSUR (June 30, 2001);

Retreaded Tires II, supra note 76, $ 62, 63.
92. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 88, art. 50(d).
93. Retreaded Tires II, supra note 76, $ 1.
94. Infra pt. V.
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gentina to prohibit the import of tires if they posed a risk to the
environment. 95
B.

DECISION OF THE PERMANENT REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Uruguay, unsatisfied with the decision of the Ad Hoc Tribunal, submitted the controversy to the Permanent Review Tribunal (PRT). 96 Exercising its review powers, 97 the PRT overruled the decision of the Ad Hoc
Tribunal, 9 8 sustaining that the Argentinean law was not compatible with
the MERCOSUR regime. 99 The reason for overruling the decision was
that the Ad Hoc Tribunal committed substantial mistakes of law. 100 One
of those mistakes was that the Ad Hoc Tribunal did not create a standard
of law as to when and how to apply the exceptions to free trade based on
the Montevideo Treaty article 50.101 The tribunal also shifted the burden
of proof in cases where it was uncertain that damage to the environment
10 2
would result, although no express law existed as to that requirement.
V.

A.

ESTOPPEL
GENERALITIES

The origins of the word estoppel are not clear.10 3 Some authors say
10 4
that the word derives from the word estop, which is a synonym of stop.
Others trace its origins to the French word estoupe.10 5 However, all agree
that estoppel is a rule of equity' 0 6 that prevents a person from denying an
already accepted state of affairs.' 0 7 Indeed, "the name of 'estoppel'...
was given 'because a man's own act or acceptance stoppeth... his mouth
to allege or plead the truth."' 10 8 Then, the principle "restrains a party
from testifying or speaking as to the truth or falsity of those events."'10 9
Although the principle of estoppel had its origins in "the earliest days
95.
96.
97.
98.

Retreaded Tires II, supra note 76,
99.
Olivos Protocol, supra note 6, art. 17.
Id. arts. 17, 22.
Laudo No 1/2005 contra el Laudo arbitral del Tribunal Arbitral ad hoc en la con-

troversia

'PROIBIIICI(N

DE

IMPORTACION

1)1

NFUMATICOS

REMOLDEFAI)OS

PROCEDENTES DEL URUGUAY', Dec. 20, 2005, $ 26 (Del Tribunal Permanente de

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Revisi6n).
Id. 9 26.2.
Id. 25.
Id. [10.
Id. 20.
See Christopher Brown, A Comparativeand Critical Assessment of Estoppel in InternationalLaw, 50 U. MIAMI L. Riv. 369, 371 (1996); see also HERMAN, supra
note 60.

104. Brown, supra note 103, at 371.
105. HERMAN, supra note 60; see also Ei-ZAB3IIr
"OPPI]IL 7 (2000).
106. See Brown, supra note 103, at 370.
107. Id. at 371.
108.

COOKi-, TiHL MODERN LAW OF Es-

MELVILLE M. BiHiELLOW, A TiRE-ATISE ON TIE LAW O1, Es'rop
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CATION IN PRAU-ICE 4 (Little, Brown, and Co., 4th ed. 1886) (citing Lord Coke).
109. Brown, supra note 103, at 371.
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of the Roman Law," 110 it evolved to be an equity doctrine applied in the
common law system. 1 In the United States, the doctrine of estoppel has
evolved to be used in various areas of law, like contracts law and property
2
law.'"
According to Brown, "[t]here are four primary rubrics under which numerous forms of estoppel can be placed: estoppel by representation, estoppel by record, estoppel by deed, and the various forms of estoppel by
silence."' 13
Estoppel in pais, which means "in the country" or "in the land," is a
type of estoppel from medieval common law 1 4 and was the root of estoppel by representation."15 It was used to prove acts that occurred in the
presence of witnesses.1 6 In medieval times, "[l]ivery (of seisin), entry,
acceptance of rent, partition, and the acceptance of an estate" created
estoppel in pais.17 When this doctrine is successfully applied, "the estopped party cannot resile from representation derived from his or her
notorious act."" 8 "Estoppel by acceptance of rent ... occurred where
the landlord accepted rent from a tenant who held over after the expiration of a lease by deed." 11 9 This form of estoppel, by acceptance of rent,
20
still remains.'
Then, estoppel by representation arises:
[wihere one person ("the representor") has made a representation to
another person ("the representee") in words or by acts or conduct,
or (being under a duty to the representee to speak or act) by silence
or inaction, with the intention (actual or presumptive), and with the
result of inducing the representee on the faith of such representation
to alter his position to his detriment, the representor, in any litigation
which may afterwards take place between him and the representee,
is estopped, as against the representee, from making, or attempting
to establish by evidence, any averment substantially at variance with
at the proper time, and
his former representation, if the representee
2
in the proper manner, objects thereto.' '
What is important in estoppel by representation is that the representor
has knowledge of "the information that would render the representation
false" 1 22 and the representee detrimentally relies on the false representa110. HERMAN, supra note 60, at 7

Palmer, supra note 62, at 24-25; see also COOKE, supra note 105, at 19.
See Brown, supra note 103, at 370.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Adam Ship, The Primacy of Expectancy in Estoppel Remedies: An Historical and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 46 ALBERTA L. REV. 77, 85 (2008).
116. Brown, supra note 103, at 372.
117. BIGELLOW, supra note 108, at 445.
118. Ship, supra note 115, at 84.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

119. BIGELLOW, supra note 108, at 446.

120. Id.
121. Brown, supra note 103, at 372.
122. Ship, supra note 115, at 86.
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tion. 123 Although "its application can have significant effects on the substantive aspects of a claim . . .estoppel by representation in AngloAmerican law is a rule of procedure and cannot serve as the basis of a
24
claim."1
Estoppel by record, also known as res judicata, "refers to the testimony
of a witness which over time became written."' 25 It originated from the
German notion that the "king's seal attached to a document rendered its
contents incontestable, ' 126 and it evolved to the notion that tribunal decisions are final and the parties cannot contractually modify them. 127 This
type of estoppel belongs to the procedural world, and it is based on the
interest of the commonwealth to end litigation and on the principle that
28
no one shall be punished twice in regards to the same event.'
Estoppel by deed, also called estoppel by matter in writing, 129 is the
type of estoppel in "which a person may be estopped from acting inconsistently with a deed to which he was a party.., or if the deed's execution
was based on a false premise, a party may be estopped from invoking the
130
falsity."
Estoppel by silence is a set of categories of estoppel, which are acquiescence and laches.13 1 "Acquiescence applies when a party remains silent
while another party mistakenly violates the first party's rights and the
first party's willful silence encourages the latter party unwittingly to continue the violation. '132 Laches, instead, "aims to prevent a party from
1 33
bringing claims after a long delay."'
B.

ESTOPPEL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The doctrine of estoppel in international law "is little more than a
maxim exhorting the parties to act consistently."' 34 But "the basic proposition that parties should act consistently is so broad [and] ...[t]he
possible means of implementing such a proposition are so numerous that
one must look to more specific municipal law analogies.' 35 It is also
important to mention that the doctrine of estoppel has not become a customary rule of international law:
123. Id. at 90.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Brown, supra note 103, at 374.
Id.; see also COOKE, supra note 105.
Ship, supra note 115, at 83.
Id.
Brown, supra note 103, at 375-76 (referring to the principles of interest reipulicae
Ut sit finis litium and nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa).

129. BIGELLOW, supra note 108, at 320.

130.
131.
132.
133.

Ship, supra note 115, at 83 (alteration in original).
Brown, supra note 103, at 377.
Id.
Id. at 377-78; see also Stanev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36760/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 194
(2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108

690; Savez Crkava v. Croatia, App. No. 7798/08, Eur. Ct. H.R.

122 (2010), availa-

ble at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102173.

134. Brown, supra note 103, at 384.
135. Id.
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[I]t is equally difficult to maintain that international custom is the
foundation of estoppel in international law. According to Brownlie,
there are four elements which must be satisfied for a practice or custom to become law under Article 38(1)(b): 1) duration, 2) consistency of practice, 3) generality of practice and 4) opinio juris et
necessitatis. Even if the first and third elements exist, the other two
elements present problems. First, although certain jurists recognize a
consistent and well-established practice with regard to estoppel, arbitral decisions and cases before international courts dealing with estoppel have failed to arrive at clear and workable definition of the
rule. Second, in applying the element of opinio juris et necessitatis,
the subjective element of customary law, one can properly ask how
any certainty or conviction can exist
with regard to a principle as ill136
defined as international estoppel.
Then, for Brown, a possible explanation for the acceptance of estoppel
in the international plane is that the doctrine is a powerful "juridical wild
card allowing one who plays it in international law to make it represent
any legal notion he desires."' 137 In international law, "equity has been
faced with skepticism for vagueness and lack of predictability, while
'stand-alone' general principles of law have lapsed into a considerable
degree of obscurity regarding their origin, practical utility, and modus
'138
operandi, overtly disadvantaged to treaty and custom.
In the international plane, two notions of estoppel have evolved. First,
a narrower one, which "adheres somewhat to the strictures of the AngloAmerican estoppel by representation. ' 139 Second, a broader one that is
related to common law estoppel, but "is less strictly defined and has a
40
broader scope of application.'
The doctrine of estoppel arrived to the international arena through arbitrations that involved "English and American parties.' 4 1 However, its
use expanded to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Inter1 43
national Court of Justice, 142 and even to cases in the European Union.
Additionally, the Central American Court of Justice, the judicial body of
the Organization of Central American Estates, "has recognized the full
applicability of the principle of Estoppel in the context of the Central
1 44
American integration process."'
136. Id. Therefore, it is only sustained by article 38.1(c) of the Statue of the I.C.J.
137. Id.

138. Gourgourinis, supra note 5, at 80-81.
139. Brown, supra note 103, at 396; see also Accordance with International Law of the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion,
2010 I.C.J. 403, 42 (July 20, 2010); Sovereignty over Pedra BrancalPulau Batu
Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment, 2008
I.C.J. 12, $ 228 (May 23, 2008).
140. Brown, supra note 103, at 396.

141. Id.
142. Id. at 388, 390.
143. See Retreaded Tires II, supra note 76, $ 84-85.
144. Bel6n Olmos Giupponi, InternationalEconomic Law (IEL) and Sources of Law in
MERCOSUR: An Analysis of a Fifteen-Year Relationship (Int'l Studies Ass'n,
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As an example of the use of estoppel in international law, more specifically in arbitration, Professor Brown points out to three cases: the
1 45
Corvaia arbitration, the Tinoco case, and the Shufeldt case.
The Corvaia arbitration involved an Italian citizen who had severed all
his ties to Italy. Italy asserted that it could state a claim in his behalf.
However, the arbitrator rejected Italy's position and said that Italy was
estopped from asserting the claim on behalf of the person. The arbitrator
was American, and he applied estoppel as understood domestically:
as detrimental reliance, which professor Brown calls stricto sensu
46
estoppel.1
In Tinoco, Great Britain initiated a suit against Costa Rica. The issue
was the payment of debt entered by the previous government that arrived
to power after a military coup. When the new government took control,
it rejected its obligations to a Britannic Bank, and Great Britain sued.
Costa Rica alleged estoppel arguing that Great Britain never recognized
the past government. The tribunal rejected the estoppel defense applying
147
the definition of estoppel stated in Corvaia.
In Shufeldt, the United States sued Guatemala concerning the issue of
a concession. The concession was given by Guatemala to an American
diplomat; however, the Guatemalan parliament did not approve the
transaction. The tribunal based its decision on the existence of a previous
1 48
obligation, but it recognized the use of estoppel in international law.
The principle of estoppel has also permeated some international trade
disputes. For example, in Bananas 1,149 one of the issues claimed was the
applicability of estoppel to the dispute. The panel report at that time
said, "[T]he mere fact that the EEC had notified these restrictions to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, and that such measures had not been acted
upon until now had not changed the obligations under the General
Agreement.' 150 This issue was revisited in Bananas 111,151 and it was said
that Bananas I was distinguishable from the Bananas III in which it "was
not one of 'a mere' notification of a restriction to otherwise passive parties: a schedule was negotiated during an official Round and expressly
accepted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES by their ratification and the
'estoppel' principle was simple not an issue here.' 152

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Working Paper, 2011), at 14, availableat http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p499
714_index.html.
Brown, supra note 103, at 386-88.
Id. at 386-87; see Rep. of Int'l Arbitral Awards: Corvaia Case (of a general nature), vol. X at 609 (1903), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol-X/609-635.pdf.
Brown, supra note 104, at 387; see Aguilar-Armory & Royal Bank of Can. claims
(Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R.I.A.A. 371, 382-84 (1923).
Brown, supra note 104, at 387-88.
Report of the Panel, EEC-Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas, DS32/R
(June 3, 1993) at 29 (unadopted) [hereinafter Bananas f], available at http://
www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/eecbananas.pdf.

150. Id. at 79.
151.

Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, 4.100, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND (May 22, 1997).
152. Id. (citing Bananas I, at 80)
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The principle of estoppel has been used since the creation of the Permanent Court of Justice and the International Court of Justice. As an
case and
example of them, Professor Brown points out the Serbian Loans
1 53
the Cases Concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland.
154
In Serbian Loans,

[t]he Permanent Court of [... ] Justice ... examined the question of
estoppel for the first time .... The case involved certain loan contracts concluded between Serbian and French financers. The SerbCroat-Slovene government alleged that, although . .. the loans required [payment] in gold . . . the lenders previously accepted paythe right to demand that
ment in currency and had thereby forfeited
55
subsequent payment be made in gold.'
The Court in this case concluded that the principle of estoppel was not
applicable because the French government was trying to solve the dispute
through diplomatic means, and it caused an understandable delay. 156 Additionally, the Court said that the requirements of estoppel had not been
met because "[t]here has been no clear and unequivocal representation
by the bondholders upon which the debtor State was entitled to rely and
157
has relied."'
The Case Concerning the Status of Greenland, 58 involved the desire of
Denmark for other states to recognize its sovereignty over "certain parts
of Eastern Greenland. 1 59 In 1919, Norway indicated that it "would not
160
challenge Denmark's sovereignty claims over Eastern Greenland.'
Both countries alleged estoppel. The Court stated that Denmark was not
estopped from alleging sovereignty over the Eastern Greenland because
it had claimed sovereignty over the territory several times.' 61 However,
162
"the court rejected Norway's claim without explanation."
The principle of estoppel continued to be used by states in the International Court of Justice. Indeed, "[e]stoppel is a well-accepted doctrine in
matters before the International Court of Justice.' 63 The court visited
the principle in Fisheries and Nottebohm, but "[t]he most comprehensive
examination of the estoppel doctrine made by the International Court of
153. Brown, supra note 103, at 388-89.
154. Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (France v. Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20 (July 12)
[hereinafter Serbian Loans], available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1929.07.12_paymentl.htm.
155. Brown, supra note 103, at 388.
156. Serbian Loans, supra note 154, 9 80.
157. Id.
158. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/
B) No. 53 (Sept. 5) [hereinafter Greenland case], available at http://www.world
courts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1 933.04.05-greenland.htm.
159. Brown, supra note 103, at 388-89.
160. Id. at 389.
161. Greenland case, supra note 158, 91158.
162. Brown, supra note 103, at 389.
163. Id. at 390.

318

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 20

1 64
Justice was in Temple of Preah Vihear."'
The Fisheries165 involved the validity of the borders or lines delimitating the Norwegian Fisheries zone. 16 6 The allegations of the parties
"made no specific reference to estoppel. Nonetheless, it is often cited as
an example of estoppel in international law."' 167 The court held that the
United Kingdom had accepted "certain seas adjacent to Norway as part
of Norway's territorial waters."' 168 Then, although the court did not talk
about estoppel expressly, it decided the case based on the principle's basic notions.

In Nottebohm, 169 Liechtenstein expressly argued estoppel saying "that

Guatemala formerly recognized the naturalization [of Mr. Nottebohm]
which it now challenges and cannot therefore be heard to put forward a
contention which is inconsistent with its former attitude.' 70 In this case,
Liechtenstein was suing Guatemala on behalf of Mr. Nottebohm. 17'
However, the court said that there "is nothing [in the file] to show that
before the institution of the proceedings Guatemala had recognized
Liechtenstein's title to exercise protection in favor of Nottebohm and
that it is thus precluded from denying such a title." 172 The court rejected
73
Liechtenstein's position.
The Temple of Preah Vihear 174 concerned the rights on the temple,
which was located on the borders of Cambodia and Thailand.' 75 "The
dispute focused on a series of earlier events which occurred when France,
as a protectorate, had controlled Indochina.' 76 France and Thailand
agreed on a temporary border, and the agreement placed the temple on
the Cambodian side.1 77 Thailand alleged that the maps, which reflected
the agreement, were not valid because "the maps received from Paris
were only seen by minor officials who had no expertise in cartography,
and would know nothing about the Temple of Preah Vihear.' 78 The
court held that Thailand could not rely on that argument because the
country, at its own risk, relied on the work of "minor officials." Additionally, when the facts demonstrated that high-ranking officers, like the
164. Id. at 390, 392.
165. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116, No. 5 (Dec. 18,
1951), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/5/1809.pdf.
166. Id. at 118-19.
167. Brown, supra note 103, at 390.
168. Id.
169. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, No. 18 (Apr. 6) [hereinafter
Nottebohm case], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2674.pdf.
170. Id. at 17.
171. Brown, supra note 103, at 390.
172. Nottebohm Case, supra note 169, at 19.
173. Brown, supra note 103, at 391.
174. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, No. 45 (Jun. 15, 1962)
[hereinafter Temple of Preah Vihear], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/45/4871 .pdf.
175. Id. at 15.
176. Brown, supra note 103, at 392.
177. Id.
178. Temple of Preah Vihear, supra note 174, at 25.
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Foreign Minister, saw the maps, 179 the court rejected Thailand's position.
The principle of estoppel arrived to the MERCOSUR for the first time
in 2002.180 This case was resolved under the Brasilia Protocol just days
before the Olivos Protocol was signed. 18 1 This controversy involved182a
Brazilian law prohibiting the importation to Brazil of retreaded tires.
Uruguay alleged, inter alia, the principle of estoppel. 183 The court defined estoppel in a restrictive way, saying that estoppel is the obligation of
a state to respect a determined course of conduct that would have a secondary effect in another state, and injury would result to the other relying
state if the state changed its conduct. 184 The court held that the Brazilian
law was incompatible with MERCOSUR law because it was contrary to a
decision of the Council of the Common Market 85 and also violated principles of international law concerning estoppel. 186 "In sum, the case
before the MERCOSUR ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal was a purely interpretative and procedural nature. It was not a case where Brazil conceded its
legislation was flawed, but defensive-it was simply a matter of analysis
and interpretation as to the scope of [the Brazilian law]." 187
C.

ESTOPPEL IN

MERCOSUR

AFTER THE OLIVOS PROTOCOL

1. Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal Award of 2005
One of the arguments that Uruguay made in the case was the application of estoppel to the facts.1 88 Analyzing this principle, the court said
that estoppel had been applied in the international sphere as a means to
provide stability, certainty, and continuity to the international obligations.' 89 Additionally, the court defined estoppel as:
[A] principle that forbids a complaining state to claim for its benefit
the fulfillment of a right or the exercise of a lawful power, if such
claim is contrary to a conduct previously accepted by the state...
and it is incompatible with the legitimate expectative created in the
legal patrimony of a state, or states, which in good faith and reasonably, has trusted the truthfulness of the previous conduct and has accommodated their interests to conform that new state of affairs
179. Id.
180. See Laudo N 1/2002 (Uruguay v. Brazil) Prohibicion de Importacion de Neumaticos Remoldeados, Jan. 9, 2002, (Tribunal Arbitral), [hereinafter Retreated Tires
1]
181. The decision is dated Jan. 9, 2002, and the Olivos Protocol was signed on Feb. 18,
2002.
182. Retreated Tires I, supra note 180.
183. Id.
184. Id. ([E]I estoppel... el cardcter obligatorio de las declaraciones de un Estado que
le obligan a respetar una conducta determinada, tiene como base actos secundarios
de un tercer Estado y consecuencias perjudiciales que resultarfan de un cambio de
actitud del Estado que cre6 la expectativa en el otro Estado).
185. CMC Decision 22/00 (July 30, 2000).

186.
187.
188.
189.

Retreaded Tires 1,supra note 180.
Lavranos, supra note 25, at 215.
supra note 76,
Retreaded Tires 1I,
Id.

82.
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created.1 90
Furthermore, the court ruled that, at a minimum, estoppel must have at
least three elements: (1) a situation created by a State, as primary conduct; (2) followed by the conduct of another State, secondary conduct;
and (3) the impossibility of the State that created the situation to behave
contrary to the primary conduct. 191
The court held that the principle of estoppel was not applicable to the
case because estoppel is not an absolute principle,' 92 and also that estoppel in this case would depend on the existence of a commercial flow or
practice sufficient to generate the anticipation that an international obligation international was formed.' 93 Therefore, until October 2002,194 estoppel in MERCOSUR applied only when there was reliance by one
state on the precedent conduct of another state and if the case involved
the flow of goods across borders, 195 the flow had to be enough to create
reliance.
2.

Decision of the Permanent Review Tribunal

As stated above,' 96 Uruguay disagreed with the arbitral award decided
in favor of Argentina and appealed to the Permanent Review Tribunal.
This was the first time that the review organization had the opportunity
to evaluate an ad hoc decision. 197 Thus, the court decided to be very
explicit in explaining the nature of its review power stating that the court
can decide not only issues of law, but issues of fact. 198 It stated the issue
to be "the interpretation and application of the free trade principle and
its exceptions in article 50 of Montevideo Convention, and its application
19 9
to the [present] case.'
Then, the court went further to specify that the issue was the applicability of the exception in article 50 of the Montevideo Convention to
190. Id. 83 ("Mediante ese principio se impide que un Estado reclame para si laobservacia de un derecho de que es titular o el ejercicio de una facultad admitida por
elDerecho, sit al pretension resulta contraria al contenido de ese derecho o al
ejercicio de las facultades que lo integran o que el Derecho reconoce e incompatible con las legitimas expectativas originadas en el patrimonio juridico del Estado,
los Estados que, de Buena fe y de forma reasonable, han confiado en la veracidad
de la conducta primaria y han acomodado sus intereses de conformidad con el
Nuevo estado de las cosas asi creado.")
191. Id. 9 85.
192. Id. 9 87, 103 (pointing out that the principle of estoppel might be suspended in
reason of another principle, in this case, the principle of protection of life and
health of people and animals regulated in art. 50(d) of the Montevideo Treaty).
193. Id. % 103.
194. Including the Uruguay v. Brazil decision of the same year, but decided under the
Brasilia Protocol.
195. Retreated Tires II, supra note 76, 9 103.
196. See Olivos Protocol, supra note 96.
197. The PRT was created in February 2002 through the Olivos Protocol, and before it
there were only ad hoc tribunal decisions, wither under the new Olivos Protocol
process or the former Brasilia Protocol.
198. Arbitral Award No. 01/2005, supra note 98, 91 1-3.
199. Id. 3.
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MERCOSUR law and not to general international law. 2° ° With this perspective, the court recognized that estoppel, as "a concept of AngloSaxon origin,"'20 1 has been used in international law; however, because "it
is a non-originating . . .right outside the integration concept .. . [it]
should only be applicable to dispute settlement processes of integration
as a [measure of] last resort. '20 2 Indeed, the court ruled that although
the principles of international law are mentioned as part of the sources of
MERCOSUR, 20 3 "[their] application should always be alone subsidi' 2 °4
ary ... and only when they are applicable to the case [in review].
Analyzing the Ad Hoc Tribunal decision, the court concluded that the
20 5
elements of estoppel enunciated by the Ad Hoc tribunal were correct.
The court also agreed with the Ad Hoc Tribunal that "estoppel has not
[an] absolute character, '20 6 but it disagreed with the decision of the Ad
Hoc tribunal to add a fourth requirement to estoppel. 207 The reason is
that the fourth requirement is not consistent with an integration scheme
"in [the MERCOSUR case] with countries with diametrically different
20 8
markets and economies in size and development.
Therefore, the rule in the MERCOSUR system is that estoppel can
only be applied in MERCOSUR cases as a supplementary principle and
only when applicable to the case in review. Also, there must exist a situation created by a State (primary conduct), followed by the conduct of
that
another State (secondary conduct), and the impossibility of the State
20 9
conduct.
primary
the
to
contrary
behave
to
situation
created the
VI.

CONCLUSION

MERCOSUR was created as an intergovernmental organization rather
than a supranational organization.2 10 Consequently, the main organs of
the MERCOSUR are integrated by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
each country, the parliament is constituted of members appointed by
each member state's parliament, and the MERCOSUR Secretariat has
only supportive power in lieu of executive power. The ideas and values
of each member state are reflected in the conduct of MERCOSUR.
The member states of MERCOSUR-Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
Paraguay, Venezuela, and Bolivia-are states that employ civil (or Roman) legal systems. The civil legal system has principles of equity that
are only used as means to supplement the law, but never as a formal
source of law.
200.

Id. T 9.

201.

Id. T 21.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. $ 21 (referring to MERCOSUR as the integration process).
Olivos Protocol, supra note 6, art. 34.1.
Arbitral Award No. 01/2005, supra note 98, 9.
Id. T 22.
Id.
Id. 9 22 (arguing that the existence of permanent trade flow is not necessary).
Id.
Id.
See Vervaele, supra note 41; Taylor, supra note 55; de Araujo supra note 56.
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Estoppel is a principle, created under the primitive Roman law, which
has become a principle of equity used in common law systems. Estoppel
is the principle of law that basically prohibits a person from denying a fact
already accepted as true.
Estoppel has been widely used in various decisions involving international law, but MERCOSUR has rejected its application to MERCOSUR
law, unless there is no other option. Estoppel only applies to
MERCOSUR law as a measure of last resort when a state has detrimentally relied on the conduct of another state.
Therefore, the decision of the Permanent Review Tribunal in Uruguay
v. Argentina concerning retreaded tires is consistent with the
MERCOSUR system. The reason is that estoppel is an equity principle
used in common law systems and MERCOSUR is an intergovernmental
organization composed of countries using civil law. Estoppel is therefore
a principle extraneous to MERCOSUR law.
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